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Abstract
In 2001, the U.S. government released a rule that allowed states to “opt-out” of the federal requirement that a
physician supervise the administration of anesthesia by a nurse anesthetist. To date, 17 states have opted out. The
majority of the opt-out states cited increased access to anesthesia care as the primary rationale for their decision. In
this study, we assess the impact of state opt-out policy on access to and costs of surgeries and other procedures
requiring anesthesia services. Our null hypothesis is that opt-out rule adoption had little or no effect on surgery
access or costs. We estimate an inpatient model of surgeries and costs and an outpatient model of surgeries. Each
model uses data from multiple years of U.S. inpatient hospital discharges and outpatient surgeries. For inpatient
cost models, the coefficient of the opt-out variable was consistently positive and also statistically significant in most
model specifications. In terms of access to inpatient surgical care, the opt-out rules did not increase or decrease
access in opt-out states. The results for the outpatient access models are less consistent, with some model
specifications indicating a reduction in access associated with opt-out status, while other model specifications
suggesting no discernable change in access. Given the sensitivity of model findings to changes in model
specification, the results do not provide support for the belief that opt-out policy improves access to outpatient
surgical care, and may even reduce access to outpatient surgical care (among freestanding facilities).
Background
In 2001, the U.S. federal government released a rule that
allowed states to “opt-out” of the federal requirement
that a physician supervise the administration of
anesthesia by a nurse anesthetist. The “November 13”
rule was effective upon publication in the November 13,
2001 Federal Register. [1] For a state to opt-out of the
federal supervision requirement, the state's governor
must send a letter of attestation to the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services [1]. The letter must attest
that: 1) the state's governor has consulted with the sta-
te's boards of medicine and nursing about issues related
to access to and the quality of anesthesia services in the
state; 2) it is in the best interests of the state's citizens to
opt-out of the current federal physician supervision
requirement; and 3) the opt-out is consistent with state
law.
To date, as shown in Appendix Table 6, 17 states have
opted out. [2] The majority of the opt-out states cited
increased access to anesthesia care as the primary
rationale for their decision. [2] Collectively, in 2015
these states had about 73 million residents, or about
23% of the total resident population of the United States.
[3] The majority of the opt-out states were sparsely pop-
ulated states (e.g., Iowa, North Dakota, and Montana),
with the notable exception of California, which nonethe-
less includes large rural areas interior to the heavily pop-
ulated Pacific coast.
Following the implementation of the November 13
rule, the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) was charged with assessing whether anesthesia
outcomes differed between opt-out states and other states.
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The study analyzed Medicare data for 1999 through 2005,
and found no evidence that opting out of the oversight
requirement resulted in increased inpatient deaths or
complications. [4] Similarly, a recent Cochrane review
concluded there was insufficient evidence to conclude
whether quality of anesthesia care differed across nurse
and physician anesthesiologists [5]. However, among the
stated goals of the opt-out rule was to improve access to
anesthesia care and control growth in its costs. [6] At the
time of the rule, there was a potential shortage of anesthe-
siologists, at least in some regions and states. [7] The pre-
sumption was that allowing nurse anesthetist to practice
without physician supervision would alleviate these
shortages and thus enhance access to anesthesia care. The
lower professional service costs for nurse anesthetist
practicing without physician supervision also was pre-
sumed to lower anesthesia care costs.
Despite the importance of the presumed cost and
access benefits of the opt-out rule, to date few studies
have attempted to quantify changes in access and costs
attributable to the opt-out rules. Sun et al. [8] utilize
data from the National Inpatient Sample (NIS) to assess
whether opt-out was associated with an increase in the
percentage of patients receiving a therapeutic procedure
among patients admitted for appendicitis, bowel ob-
struction, choledocholithiasis, or hip fracture. In a simi-
lar vein, using claims data for Medicare fee-for-service
enrollees, Sun et al. [9] examine differences in average
anesthesia utilization rates three years before and after
out-out for opt-out states grouped by year of opt-out,
compared to differences in average anesthesia utilization
rates over the same time period in non-opt-out states.
Both studies conclude the adoption of the opt-out rule
had no significant impact on access to anesthesia care.
In this study, we extend the literature on the impact of
state opt-out policy by adding an assessment of its
impact on costs of surgeries, and by assessing its impact
on a wider variety of procedures requiring anesthesia
services than in prior studies. Our hypothesis is that
opt-out states exhibited changes in access to surgery and
changes in surgery costs similar to non-opt-out states;
that is, that the opt-out laws had little or no effect on
surgery access or costs. We estimate models of inpatient
surgery costs and surgery volume, as well as a model for
volume of outpatient surgeries. Each model uses data
from multiple years of U.S. inpatient hospital discharges
and outpatient surgeries. Our results indicate that the
opt-out policy is associated with higher inpatient surgery
costs, with little or no impact on access for either in-
patient or outpatient surgery.
Methods
We used two data sources that were appropriate for the
study objectives. There has been continuous growth in
outpatient surgery both in years before and years
after passage of the opt-out law. [9] Thus, we believe
that it is important to examine access and cost asso-
ciated with inpatient and outpatient surgery. We
used the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) for ana-
lysis of changes in inpatient surgery volume. The
NIS is part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization
Project (HCUP), and is the largest publicly available
all-payer inpatient health care database in the United
States, yielding national estimates of hospital in-
patient stays (https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/nisover-
view.jsp#data). Unweighted, the NIS contains data
from more than 7 million hospital stays each year.
Weighted, it estimates (or represents) more than 36
million hospitalizations nationally (around 20%).
With more than 20 years of data, the NIS is ideal for
longitudinal analyses.
However, the database has undergone changes over
time, including the sampling and weighting strategy
used. Beginning in 2012, sampling strategy for NIS
was redesigned from formerly a random sample of
hospitals and retaining all discharges from those sam-
pled hospitals to a random sample of discharges from
all hospitals participating in HCUP. To remove incon-
sistency due to change of sampling strategy, we did
not include NIS data for hospitalizations after 2011.
Thus, our NIS sample covers a 14-year time frame
from 1998 to 2011 which allows for several years
before and after the opt-out decisions by states. The
unit of observation is “facility-year.”
For outpatient surgery, we used the State Ambulatory
Surgery and Services Databases (SASD). The SASD is also
part of the HCUP system (https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/
sasdoverview.jsp). The SASD include encounter-level data
for ambulatory surgeries and “may also include various
types of outpatient services such as observation stays,
lithotripsy, radiation therapy, imaging, chemotherapy, and
labor and delivery.” The specific types of ambulatory
surgery and outpatient services included in the SASD vary
by state and data year. SASD include data from hospital-
owned ambulatory surgery facilities and nonhospital-
owned facilities.
For the outpatient analysis, we included three opt-out
states (California, Colorado, and Kentucky) and three
non-opt-out states (Florida, Maryland, and New Jersey).
These states were selected based on two criteria: [1] the
state-level SASD contain all of the data we will need to
estimate the models (e.g., procedure codes); and [2] the
state SASD data contain the sufficient pre- and post-
opt-out years. The unit of observation for the outpatient
analysis is also the “facility-year.”
Our outcomes include measures of access and cost.
The access measures were the number of all inpatient
and outpatient surgeries.1 The cost measure was average
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cost per surgical inpatient stay, calculated by using
hospital cost-to-charge ratios to deflate total charges per
stay reported in the NIS. Nominal cost estimates were
converted to constant 2011 dollars using the “Hospital
and related services” component of the Consumer Price
Index (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). No cost-to-charge ratio
estimates are available for the outpatient facilities in the
SASD, and as a result, no average cost estimates are avail-
able for outpatient procedures.
A quasi-experimental study design was used to study
the change in outcomes (access and costs) in “treatment”
facilities (those located in opt-out states) before and after
opt-out policy implementation, compared to facilities
located in non-opt-out states over the same time period.
The statistical analysis was based on panel data facility-
level fixed-effect model which examined how the change
of opt-out status affected changes in outcomes while
removing facility-level time-invariant unmeasured con-
founders. We used robust standard error estimation
adjusting for state level clustering. The null hypothesis is
that opt-out states exhibited changes in access to surgery
and changes in surgery costs similar to non-opt-out
states; that is, that the opt-out laws had little or no effect
on surgery access or costs.
The base statistical model of access is written as:
Dit ¼ αþ β1OPTit þ βnXit þ βnTt þ Ui þ εit
The unit of observation in the NIS is the discharge,
and in the SASD is the procedure. In this equation, the
dependent variable Dit refers to access (total number of
surgeries) or cost (mean cost per surgery) for facility i in
year t. The key right-hand side variable of interest is a
dummy variable OPTit indicating whether the facility is
located in an opt-out state (OPT equal to 1 if the facility
was located in an opt-out state and 0 otherwise) in
year t (For example, CA adopted opt-out in 2009;
thus OPTit = 0 before 2009 and OPTit = 1 since 2009
for CA). For a control state like FL, OPTit = 0 during
all the observed years [see Appendix Table 6]). Xit
represents a vector of covariates likely to affect access
or cost.
In the inpatient models, Xit includes facility character-
istics (bed size2 of hospital: [1] small, [2] medium, [3]
large; control/ownership of hospital: (0) government or
private, collapsed category, [1] government, nonfederal,
public, [2] private, non-profit, voluntary, [3] private,
invest-own, [4] private, collapsed category; rural or
urban hospital; and teaching or non-teaching hospital).3
The inpatient models also adjust for lagged (year t-1)
facility-level patient summary measures, including the
total number of hospitalizations, patient case mix (i.e.
percentage of cases were female, mean length of stay,
percentage of surgical cases, the mean of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services Hierarchical Condition
Category (CMS-HCC) risk score [9], age distribution
[<18, 18 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 to 74, and 75 or older]), ad-
mission type [elective, emergency, or other], percent-
age of routine discharge hospitalizations, health
insurance type [Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance,
or others], and race [white, black, Hispanic, or
others]). CMS-HCC risk adjustment was developed by
CMS to produce a health-based measure of future
medical need which has shown to be a significant
predictor of medical costs and has a better predictive
accuracy on mortality than the Charlson and Elixhau-
ser methods [10]. A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), with the market definition based on area pa-
tient flows,4 was used to adjust for area hospital mar-
ket concentration. County-level variables potentially
affecting access or cost also were included (i.e. total
number of residents in the county, percentage of the
population in poverty, percentage of the population
who are Medicare beneficiaries, percentage of people
between age 16 and 64, the unemployment rate, per
capita income, and the number of anesthesiologists
[MD/DO] per 10,000 residents).5 The remaining vari-
ables are dummy variables for time (T). Ui is facility-
level time-invariant unmeasured variable. The error
term is indicated as εit.
Many of the variables available in the NIS included in
the inpatient models were not available in the SASD. In
the multiple regression models focusing on outpatient
surgery, we used all model covariates available in the
SASD. The data do not allow identification of the county
location of freestanding outpatient facilities. Thus, the
outpatient models focusing on the sample of all
outpatient facilities account for lagged (year t-1) factors
(patient flow, risk score, disposition status, and payment
source variables), and a dummy variable for freestanding
outpatient facilities (vs. hospital outpatient surgery de-
partments). We addressed the differences (and changes)
in access in rural versus urban areas by including an
interaction terms of urban/rural indicator and opt-out
indicator in the multiple regression models. Alternative
models examine dependent variables measured in nat-
ural units and log transformations.
We conducted extensive sensitivity analysis to check
the robustness of our findings. First, for the NIS, we
examined using alternative definitions of access: 1)
Removing cases age less than 18 out of total surgical dis-
charges; 2) Removing all transplant Diagnosis-Related
Groups (DRGs) and any craniotomy DRGs; and 3) limit-
ing discharges to only hip and knee surgery procedures
(DRG 209, 471, 503, 544, 471, or 545) and mean cost
per discharge based on the definition. Because many
pediatric procedures are performed in children’s hospi-
tals where anesthesiologists provide solo care or are part
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of care team, and given that children are a unique popu-
lation (with parents making health care decisions), the
impact opt-out may be different from the impact on the
adult population. Likewise, transplants and craniotomy
represent very complex cases where, given current prac-
tice patterns, a low percentage of nurse anesthetists
would be able to practice without physician supervision
for those procedures. Hips and knees were examined sep-
arately because they represent a group of very common
and fast growing procedures which are often performed in
community hospitals.
Second, we examined robustness of our finding by
varying covariates included in the models. In the SASD,
we estimate separate models by freestanding status, a
model focusing on the volume of specific outpatient
procedures likely to require general anesthesia, and a
model excluding the lagged patient flow variables. To
examine whether early opt out have a different impact on
outcomes compared to late opt out states, we conducted a
set of sensitivity analyses in NIS sample. We repeated the
analysis among early opt out states [states with opt out
between 2001 and 2005 (i.e., IA, MN, NE, NH, NM, AK,
KS, ND, OR, WA, MT, SD, WI) compared with non-opt
out states during the period, and late opt out states (states
with opt out between 2009 and 2011 (i.e., CA and CO)
compared with non-opt out states during the period; in
the whole NIS sample, we also ran another model by
including opt-out variable (equal 1 after the opt out states
opt out) and late opt-out indicator (equal to 1 for CA and
CO during the whole study period, 1998 to 2011; equal to
zero for other states)]. The coefficients of interaction
terms show the differentiated impact of opt-out for late
opt-out states comparing to early opt-out states.
Results
The final analytic files included 13,573 facility-year
observations in the NIS sample and 9,994 facility-year
observations in the SASD sample. Descriptive data for
the main outcomes associated with the inpatient file
(NIS) and outpatient file(SASD) are shown in Appendix
Tables 7 and 8. The results for the inpatient cost models
are shown in Table 1. When cost per discharge was the
dependent variable, the estimated coefficient of the opt-
out variable was positive and statistically significant (p <
0.01). The point estimate indicates that the cost per dis-
charge was $1,815 higher in opt-out states relative to
non-opt-out states. Similarly, in the log cost models, the
estimated coefficient of the opt-out variable was positive
and statistically significant. The point estimate indicates
that the cost per discharge was about 8.7% higher in
opt-out states relative to non-opt-out states.6
For the inpatient access models (Table 2), the opt-out
variable coefficient was positive but not statistically
significant in the model with the number of hospital
discharges as the dependent variable. The magnitude of
the point estimate implies an increase in surgical dis-
charges that is small in magnitude – about 40 annually, or
about 1.8% (based on the sample mean). Similarly, in the
model that used the log of discharges as the dependent
variable, the estimated coefficient of the opt-out variable is
positive but not statistically significant.
The results for the outpatient access models are shown
in Table 3. In the model where the number of surgical
procedures is the dependent variable, the estimated
coefficient of the opt-out variable was positive but not
statistically significant. When the dependent variable is
defined as the log of procedures, the estimated coeffi-
cient of the opt-out was also positive but not statistically
significant.
To assess the robustness of our inpatient model
findings, we estimated a number of models with dif-
ferent definitions of “surgical” discharges or different
sets of covariates included in the model, as reported
in Table 4. Neither early nor late opt-out states had a
statistically significant impact on volumes. However,
hospitals in late opt-out states (i.e. CA and CO) had
a higher cost increase after state opt-out compared to
hospitals in early opt-out states. When pediatric sur-
gical discharges were removed from the facility-level
total number of annual surgical discharges, the esti-
mates of the opt-out variable coefficient remained
positive but not statistically significant, in both the
linear and log models. Similarly, when discharges for
transplants and any craniotomy DRGs were removed
from the total, or when only hip and knee procedure
discharges were included, the estimates of the opt-out
variable coefficient remained positive but not statisti-
cally significant in all models. In addition, dropping
groups of covariates from the model specification did
not materially alter the results, with one exception.
In models that excluded all hospital characteristics,
lagged patient flow variables, and county level vari-
ables, the estimated opt-out coefficients were nega-
tive, and statistically significant (p < 0.05) when the
dependent variable was the number of surgical
discharges.
In the alternative cost models, when all pediatric
surgical discharges were removed, or all discharges
for transplants and any craniotomy DRGs were re-
moved, the coefficient of the opt-out variable was
consistently positive and statistically significant. When
only hip and knee procedure discharges were in-
cluded, the estimated opt-out coefficient was positive
but not statistically significant. Similarly, when groups
of covariates were dropped from the model specifica-
tion, the coefficient of the opt-out variable remained
consistently positive and statistically significant. Point
estimates suggest costs per discharge were about
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Table 1 Inpatient Cost Models, Linear and Log Linear
Mean costs per surgical case Log Mean costs per surgical case
b t b t
Opt out 1815.33*** 3.76 0.08* 2.43
Rural hospital −584.32 −0.51 0.01 0.19
Hospital bed size
Small (reference)
Medium 85.99 0.13 −0.03 −0.68
Large −1037.20 −1.45 −0.10 −1.83
Control/ownership of hospital
Government or private, collapsed category (reference)
Government, nonfederal, public, 1403.23 0.99 −0.04 −0.93
Private, non-profit, voluntary 1448.21 0.99 −0.15** −2.85
Private, invest-own 1770.03 1.11 −0.01 −0.19
Private, collapsed category 3400.20 1.96 0.01 0.17
Teaching hospital 1648.59 1.22 −0.04 −1.30
Hospital HHI based on patient flow 11802.96 1.73 −0.26 −0.56
Lagged (year t-1) facility-level patient summary measures
Total number of hospitalizations −0.05 −0.54 −0.00 −0.44
Percentage of cases were female −2308.72 −0.24 −0.71 −0.93
Mean length of stay 426.60 1.21 0.03 1.11
Percentage of surgical cases 14348.88 1.75 0.54 1.33
Mean (CMS-HCC) risk score −438.02 −0.16 −0.27 −1.16
Age distribution (%)
<18 7003.33 0.63 0.96 0.86
18_44 (reference)
45_64 11426.77 0.91 0.18 0.20
65_74 9031.06 0.47 1.42 1.13
75 or older 8585.06 0.56 0.91 0.86
Admission type (%)
Elective (reference)
Emergency −993.71 −0.50 −0.08 −0.52
Other 1733.18 0.84 0.20 1.85
Percentage of routine discharge hospitalizations −4511.40 −0.85 −0.47 −1.35
Health insurance type (%)
Private insurance (reference)
Medicare −2590.06 −0.56 −0.15 −0.42
Medicaid −289.20 −0.06 −0.02 −0.09
Others 559.90 0.21 0.07 0.35
Race (%)
White (reference)
Black 5323.13 0.76 −0.11 −0.24
Hispanic −7994.42 −1.27 −0.38 −1.04
Other −2340.99 −1.35 −0.19 −1.63
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$1,760 to $1,980 higher (in the linear models), or
about 6.6 to 8.8% higher (in log models), for facilities
in opt-out states compared to non-opt-out states.
Several alternative specifications of the outpatient
access model were estimated, as summarized in Table 5.
In model specifications focusing on freestanding
facilities, the estimated coefficient of the opt-out
variable is negative and statistically significant, in
both the linear and log models. This implies that the
opt-out policy reduced the volume of procedures at
freestanding outpatient facilities by about 310 proce-
dures, or by about 23%. In the model limited to non-
freestanding facilities, the estimated coefficient of the
opt-out variable was positive but not statistically
significant. When the analysis focused on selected
procedures likely to require general anesthesia, the
estimated coefficient of the opt-out variable was
negative but not statistically significant. Finally, in
model specifications dropping groups of covariates,
the opt-out coefficient estimates remain positive but
not statistically significant.
Discussion
The primary intent of the opt-out laws was to increase
access to anesthesia services by increasing the scope of
practice of NAs and reducing the barriers to use of NAs.
In turn, the hypothesis is that the reduction in barriers
will increase access to surgical care. In our study, we do
not find evidence to support this belief. In addition to
the regression results presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3, we
estimated a large number of variations of these base
models (Tables 4 and 5).
Overall, the results consistently show no improvement
in access to inpatient surgical care associated with the
opt-out indicator. In other words, opt out was not asso-
ciated with increase (or decrease) in access; the opt-out
rules had no measurable effect on access. Interestingly,
states choosing to opt out were associated with subse-
quent higher costs per inpatient —about $1,800 higher
per surgery, or about 8.7%.
On the surface, the inpatient cost result seems coun-
terintuitive, as opt-out provisions in theory allow lower-
priced nurse anesthetists to perform the same services
Table 1 Inpatient Cost Models, Linear and Log Linear (Continued)
County-level variable
Total number of residents in the county 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.68
Percentage of people in poverty 42.77 0.38 0.01 0.75
Percentage of people are Medicare beneficiaries −12526.56 −0.50 −2.32 −1.27
Percentage of people between age 16 to 64 −7064.95 −0.77 −0.31 −0.65
Unemployment rate 1553.06 0.12 −0.73 −0.93
Per capita income 0.10 1.06 0.00 1.63
Number of anesthesiologists [MD/DO] per 10,000 residents −784.20 −1.39 −0.06 −1.41
Year dummy variables
2001.year (reference)
2002.year 466.64 1.66 0.14*** 6.16
2003.year 1176.08** 3.62 0.26*** 9.19
2004.year 1993.96*** 4.18 0.36*** 11.54
2005.year 2942.80*** 5.06 0.48*** 9.88
2006.year 4007.31*** 5.60 0.57*** 9.93
2007.year 5322.09*** 5.76 0.69*** 9.80
2008.year 6344.88*** 5.84 0.79*** 10.12
2009.year 7524.34*** 6.37 0.92*** 10.61
2010.year 9554.10*** 6.17 1.06*** 9.39
2011.year 10332.97*** 5.79 1.13*** 9.21
Constant −2772.51 −0.16 9.06*** 6.87
N 1,339 1,339
R-squared (within) 0.7226 0.7946
Notes: [1] t-statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; [2] Some hospital-year do not have cost-to-charge ratios; therefore, cost measure was not
available; [3] interaction term between opt-out and rural hospital status was not statistically significant; therefore, main models do not include interaction terms;
[4] Costs were in 2011 dollar adjusted by hospital and related services CPI
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Table 2 Inpatient Access Models, Linear and Log Linear
Total number of surgical discharges Log Total number of surgical discharges
b t b t
Opt out 39.78 0.62 0.05 1.08
Rural hospital −78.00 −0.87 0.05 0.35
Hospital bed size
Small (reference) .
Medium 20.62 0.77 −0.01 −0.49
Large 226.72 1.39 0.06 1.24
Control/ownership of hospital
Government or private, collapsed category (reference)
Government, nonfederal, public, −151.78 −0.86 0.20 0.53
Private, non-profit, voluntary 112.93 0.69 −0.03 −0.09
Private, invest-own 104.25 1.05 0.27 0.87
Private, collapsed category 15.87 0.10 0.01 0.05
Teaching hospital 75.87 1.12 0.05 0.39
Hospital HHI based on patient flow 254.90 0.61 0.85* 2.15
Lagged (year t-1) facility-level patient summary measures
Total number of hospitalizations 0.16*** 12.43 0.00*** 9.02
Percentage of cases were female −409.79 −0.69 −0.23 −0.21
Mean length of stay 3.98 0.37 0.00 0.01
Percentage of surgical cases 2580.39*** 5.43 3.99*** 4.46
Mean (CMS-HCC) risk score −51.14 −0.34 −0.55 −1.55
Age distribution (%)
<18 293.78 0.49 2.70 1.83
18_44 (reference)
45_64 −185.31 −0.24 2.07 1.49
65_74 597.26 1.22 2.28 1.81
75 or older 483.46 0.92 0.34 0.31
Admission type (%)
Elective (reference)
Emergency −46.15 −0.40 0.21 1.04
Other 124.02 1.27 0.08 0.49
Percentage of routine discharge hospitalizations −330.91 −1.27 −0.23 −0.58
Health insurance type (%)
Private insurance (reference)
Medicare −106.02 −0.28 0.23 0.54
Medicaid 163.72 0.61 0.50 1.23
Others −29.26 −0.14 0.15 0.57
Race (%)
White (reference)
Black −2054.46* −2.62 −0.21 −0.32
Hispanic 154.64 0.42 0.23 0.40
Other −168.06* −2.14 −0.07 −0.79
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as physician anesthesiologists. However, as some recent
research has shown, nurse anesthetists take longer to
perform the same services. [11] As a result, despite the
lower payment per unit for nurse anesthetists, the greater
number of units provided may translate into higher
anesthesia costs overall. Moreover, recent research sug-
gests that surgery procedures with nurse anesthesia pro-
viders working without physician supervision have
worse surgery outcomes in terms of complications re-
quiring additional treatment. [6–8] Clearly, surgical
procedures with these complications are likely to
entail higher overall costs than procedures without
complications. [9] Thus, the observed higher costs in
opt-out states could be a result of the combined ef-
fects of these two issues.
The results for the outpatient access models are less
consistent, with some model specifications indicating a
reduction in access associated with opt-out status, while
other model specifications suggesting no discernable
change in access. It is possible that the limited number
of states included in the analysis contributed to this
inconsistency. Given the sensitivity of model findings to
changes in model specification, the results do not pro-
vide support for the belief that opt-out policy improves
access to outpatient surgical care, and may even reduce
access to outpatient surgical care (among freestanding
facilities).
There are some important limitations to this study.
First, this is an observational study where states chose
to opt out; opt-out was nota random event. There are
potential unmeasured confounders associated with
opt-out and outcomes. The analytic approach we used
eliminates the impact of any unobservables across
states that are time-invariant, but does not account
for the potential impact of time-varying unobserv-
ables. It is possible that the association between opt-
out status and higher surgical costs results from
differences between opt-out and non-out-out states
not accounted for in our analysis. Second, some opt-
out states declared opt-out status toward the end of
Table 2 Inpatient Access Models, Linear and Log Linear (Continued)
County-level variable
Total number of residents in the county −0.00 −0.17 −0.00 −1.24
Percentage of people in poverty −2.75 −0.31 0.00 0.23
Percentage of people are Medicare beneficiaries −258.94 −0.24 −1.00 −0.87
Percentage of people between age 16 to 64 −285.91 −0.70 −1.23 −2.03
Unemployment rate −81.65 −0.07 −4.55* −2.79
Per capita income 0.01 1.14 0.00 2.03
Number of anesthesiologists [MD/DO] per 10,000 residents 231.51 2.04 −0.02 −0.29
Year dummy variables
1999.year (reference) 0.00 . 0.00 .
2000.year 78.70* 2.58 −0.01 −0.45
2001.year 90.38* 2.27 0.01 0.22
2002.year 70.76 1.02 0.07 1.33
2003.year 81.98 1.21 0.07 0.85
2004.year 141.51 1.88 −0.01 −0.12
2005.year 122.69 1.53 −0.08 −0.75
2006.year −2.13 −0.03 −0.15 −1.38
2007.year 44.26 0.49 −0.19 −1.84
2008.year 59.28 0.45 −0.15 −1.14
2009.year −4.30 −0.03 0.02 0.10
2010.year −55.14 −0.29 0.01 0.07
2011.year −183.95 −0.97 −0.06 −0.29
Constant 295.62 0.55 4.94** 3.37
N 2063 2063
R-squared (within) 0.4010 0.2019
Notes: [1] t-statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; [2] Some hospital-year do not have cost-to-charge ratios; therefore, cost measure was not
available; [3] interaction term between opt-out and rural hospital status was not statistically significant; therefore, main models do not include interaction terms
Schneider et al. Health Economics Review  (2017) 7:10 Page 8 of 25
the timeline of available data, thereby providing a
small number of years post opt-out years for the fa-
cility fixed-effects panel models. However, accounting
for early vs. late opt-out status indicated later opt-out
status was associated with greater increase in cost
that the cost increase in early opt-out states, relative
to non-opt-out states, but did not alter the finding of
no significant improvement in access associated with
opt-out. In addition, NIS randomly selected a 20%
random sample of national hospitals during out study
period. Some hospitals were not included in our sam-
ple or contribute fewer years of observation times
Table 3 Outpatient Access Linear and Log Models
Total number of surgical procedures
(w/o county variables)
Log of total number of surgical procedures
(w/o county variables)
b t b t
Opt out 1149.18 1.06 0.06 0.71
Lagged (year t-1) facility-level patient summary measures
Percentage of female 10380.26 1.28 0.11 0.69
Mean (CMS-HCC) risk score 9003.39 2.17 0.24 1.45
Age distribution (%)
<18 5126.30 0.48 0.04 0.06
18_44 (reference)
45_64 8195.99 0.84 0.52 1.18
65_74 −29766.70 −0.86 −0.46 −1.31
75 or older −13872.42 −1.10 0.76 1.26
Percentage of routine discharge hospitalizations 2073.23 0.52 −0.08 −0.67
Health insurance type (%)
Private insurance
Medicare −1380.08 −0.68 −0.25 −1.79
Medicaid −10119.71 −0.93 −0.27 −1.04
Others −10856.39 −1.07 −0.46** −5.48
Freestanding −1043.54 −1.04 −0.08 −1.56
Year dummy variables
1999.year (reference)
2000.year −16.36 −0.05 0.05*** 11.74
2001.year −923.90 −1.34 0.02* 3.63
2002.year −876.51 −1.00 0.09*** 9.77
2003.year 7386.10** 4.19 0.61*** 21.00
2004.year 9061.60*** 16.62 0.76*** 36.50
2005.year 10213.33*** 20.49 0.79*** 41.31
2006.year 11373.59*** 22.15 0.84*** 43.80
2007.year 32466.04*** 59.07 1.58*** 78.96
2008.year 63228.57*** 202.11 2.26*** 73.62
2009.year 62817.03*** 271.86 2.18*** 207.52
2010.year 62829.63*** 143.72 2.15*** 162.03
2011.year 62947.40*** 89.87 2.12*** 91.22
2012.year 63165.88*** 57.08 2.14*** 74.13
2013.year 64712.58*** 27.96 2.21*** 17.61
Constant −57093.83*** −15.05 5.98*** 18.56
N 7856 7856
Squared (within) 0.3581 0.4638
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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Table 4 Sensitivity analyses on NIS sample (Coefficients of opt-out variable)
Total number of
surgical discharges




Log Mean costs per
surgical case
Main model 39.78 0.0529 1815.3*** 0.0840*
(0.62) (1.08) (3.76) (2.43)
Subgroup analysis
Early opt-outa vs control 103.9 0.0741 644.5 0.0183
(1.50) (1.50) (1.42) (0.50)
Late opt-outb vs control −185.4 0.0234 2461.0*** 0.120*
(−1.14) (0.29) (4.42) (2.38)
opt-out variable * late opt-outc −279.9 −0.0687 2202.9** 0.130*
(−1.87) (−1.16) (3.09) (2.38)
Alternative definitions of surgical case
Removing cases age <18 out of total surgical discharges 39.91 0.0410 1833.5** 0.0784*
(0.61) (0.98) (3.41) (2.28)
Removing all transplant DRGs and any craniotomy DRGs 38.84 0.0535 1757.2*** 0.0831*
(0.61) (1.09) (3.75) (2.39)
Include only hip and knee surgery procedures 24.12 0.00109 494.1 0.0292
(1.55) (0.03) (0.63) (1.27)
Using partial covariates
Exclude hospital characteristics 33.71 0.0477 1839.3*** 0.0762*
(0.56) (1.08) (4.08) (2.72)
Exclude hospital characteristics and county variables 6.887 0.0364 1903.8** 0.0637*
(0.12) (0.70) (3.06) (2.10)
Exclude hospital variables, county variables and t-1 year variables −110.4* −0.0561 1977.9** 0.0709***
(−2.03) (−1.18) (2.91) (4.71)
Notes: Costs were in 2011 dollar adjusted by hospital and related services CPI; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
aEarly opt out =1 for those hospitals in states opt out between 2001 and 2005 (i.e. IA, MN, NE, NH, NM, AK, KS, ND, OR, WA, MT, SD, WI)
bLate opt out =1 for those hospitals in states opt out between 2009 and 2010 (i.e. CA, CO)
cThis is the coefficient for the interaction term between opt-out variable and late opt out variable. The model was conducted on whole sample to test whether
state opt out in recent year had different impact on outcomes comparing those opt out in early year
Table 5 Sensitivity and subgroup analyses on SASD sample (Coefficients of opt-out variable)
Total number of surgical procedures Log of total number of surgical procedures







Alternative definition of surgical cases





Exclude t-1 year case mix variables 537.3 0.0496
(0.34) (0.48)
Notes: [1] Hospital characteristics and county variables were not available for freestanding facilities; [2] procedures with CPT code of 19301, 19302, 23410, 23412, 23420,
23430, 23470, 23472, 23473, 23474, 23700, 24300, 24341, 24342, 24363, 24370, 24371, 29827, 29882, 29883, 42821, 42826, 47562, 47563, 47600, 47605, 49505, 49507,
49520, 49521, 49525, 49587, 49650, 49651, 58541, 58542, 58543, 58544, 58545, 58546, 58550, 58552, 58553, 58554, 58570, 58571, 58572, 58573, 58670, 58671;
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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which might reduce to power for the facility-level
fixed-effects model. However, given the large sample,
it is unlikely to be threat to our main conclusion.
Finally, the opt-out status variable is a “black box” in
our analysis – it does not measure to what extent
either the number of nurse anesthetists or physician
anesthesiologists, or their typical workloads, actually
changed as a result of the implementation of the opt-
out policy. However, our results suggest that, what-
ever the impact of opt-out on the actual supply of
anesthesia services, the net impact of opt-out policy
implementation was little or no impact on access to
inpatient or outpatient surgical care, and an increase
in the cost of inpatient surgical care.
Conclusions
Our results do not support the hypothesis that opt-out
laws improve access to inpatient surgical care or reduce
its costs. Across a number of specifications for our
inpatient discharges models, we find a consistent pattern
of point estimates of increased costs with no discernable
impact on access. Findings for our outpatient access
models are less consistent, but overall, our results sug-
gest opt-out policies were not associated with improve-
ment in access to outpatient surgery.
Endnotes
1In NIS, the total number of all surgeries was the
sum of all hospitalizations with surgical DRG in a fa-
cility (excluding records with patients age younger
than 1); In SASD, it was the total number of visits in
the facility.
2We used the size classification defined by HCUP, for
which specific bed-size thresholds for size categories
vary across Census regions, and by urban/rural and
teaching status (https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/db/vars/
hosp_bedsize/nisnote.jsp).
3These facility level variables were almost fixed over
the sample time period. Dropping the facility variables
from the facility fixed-effects model does not change
model results.
4The market area definition recommended by HCUP
was used (see HCUP Hospital Market Structure File:
2009 Central Distributor SID, NIS, and KID User Guide
[https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/hms/
HMSUserGuide2009.pdf].) Years with missing HHI
values were imputed using a time trend.
5The source for these data is county-level data from
the Area Resource File (ARF).






Table 6 Opt out year-month for states included in our NIS and
SASD sample
Included in our sample
State Opt-out date NIS SASD
Alaska Oct. 2003 Yes No
Arizona NA Yes No
Arkansas NA Yes No
California Jun. 2009 Yes Yes
Colorado Sept. 2010 Yes Yes
Connecticut NA Yes No
Florida NA Yes Yes
Georgia NA Yes No
Hawaii NA Yes No
Illinois NA Yes No
Indiana NA Yes No
Iowa Dec. 2001 Yes No
Kansas Apr. 2003 Yes No
Kentucky Apr. 2012 Yes yes
Louisiana NA Yes No
Maine NA Yes No
Maryland NA Yes Yes
Massachusetts NA Yes No
Michigan NA Yes No
Minnesota Apr. 2002 Yes No
Mississippi NA Yes No
Missouri NA Yes No
Montana Jan. 2004 Yes No
Nebraska Feb. 2002 Yes No
Nevada NA Yes No
New Hampshire Jun. 2002 Yes No
New Jersey NA Yes Yes
New Mexico Nov. 2002 Yes No
New York NA Yes No
North Carolina NA Yes No
North Dakota Oct. 2003 Yes No
Ohio NA Yes No
Oklahoma NA Yes No
Oregon Dec. 2003 Yes No
Pennsylvania NA Yes No
Rhode Island NA Yes No
South Carolina NA Yes No
South Dakota Mar. 2005 Yes No
Tennessee NA Yes No
Texas NA Yes No
Utah NA Yes No
Vermont NA Yes No
Virginia NA Yes No
Washington Oct. 2003 Yes No
West Virginia NA Yes No
Wisconsin Jun. 2005 Yes No
Wyoming NA Yes No
Appendix
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS)
Hospital state Calendar year Total number of
surgical procedures




Log Mean costs per
surgical case
Mean Std N Mean Std N Mean Std N Mean Std N
AK 2010 352.50 318.91 2 5.60 1.07 2 24009.66 1392.48 2 10.09 0.06 2
2011 389.00 405.88 2 5.57 1.34 2 28491.65 3365.32 2 10.25 0.12 2
AR 2004 1303.41 2157.82 29 5.36 2.50 29 5750.00 2145.57 22 8.59 0.36 22
2005 1266.71 1802.66 24 5.86 2.01 24 6588.21 2567.39 20 8.71 0.44 20
2006 1095.63 1635.97 24 5.41 2.20 24 8517.11 9471.11 15 8.80 0.60 15
2007 609.68 1196.46 22 4.80 2.27 22 8088.49 6913.90 17 8.80 0.61 17
2008 1643.27 2325.74 22 5.42 2.76 22 8132.00 3451.52 19 8.90 0.50 19
2009 1400.42 2006.85 19 5.45 2.63 19 9725.37 3875.93 16 9.11 0.39 16
2010 989.94 1946.63 16 5.03 2.21 16 12334.08 5633.30 15 9.34 0.41 15
2011 1383.13 2230.16 16 5.94 1.71 16 11072.76 7855.47 12 9.17 0.50 12
AZ 1998 2099.46 2273.16 13 6.36 2.43 13 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2491.25 2883.66 12 6.53 2.41 12 . . 0 . . 0
2000 3115.64 3147.09 14 7.22 1.86 14 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2817.27 2671.47 11 7.33 1.34 11 3893.65 1037.64 10 8.22 0.35 10
2003 1829.69 2648.37 13 5.96 2.37 13 5872.07 2489.39 12 8.59 0.46 12
2004 3077.92 4407.92 13 6.09 2.79 13 10111.39 11406.00 12 8.96 0.63 12
2005 3351.11 4311.27 18 6.52 2.88 18 8077.58 2029.58 11 8.97 0.25 11
2006 4043.00 4349.95 15 7.05 2.46 15 11028.56 2180.83 12 9.29 0.22 12
2007 3421.53 4125.20 15 7.15 1.71 15 10193.32 2876.50 13 9.20 0.27 13
2008 3892.56 4886.74 16 6.31 3.04 16 14195.29 11241.22 16 9.40 0.52 16
2009 2790.31 2664.93 16 6.98 2.02 16 18316.77 14801.73 15 9.66 0.50 15
2010 2791.87 2514.98 15 6.96 2.33 15 13640.12 4886.16 15 9.46 0.37 15
2011 2929.69 3247.85 16 6.88 2.30 16 15769.02 4543.36 15 9.63 0.27 15
CA 1998 2121.70 2167.99 94 6.96 1.54 94 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2330.86 2503.90 95 7.06 1.57 95 . . 0 . . 0
2000 2218.62 2375.59 91 7.02 1.50 91 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2470.48 2350.32 93 6.98 1.93 93 5827.07 2725.23 76 8.59 0.41 76
2002 2777.43 2780.51 92 7.22 1.68 92 7099.43 2607.84 59 8.81 0.35 59
2003 2636.85 2417.21 85 7.27 1.42 85 7754.73 3393.70 65 8.88 0.39 65
2004 2548.71 2434.74 82 7.26 1.31 82 9071.56 4796.00 64 9.03 0.37 64
2005 2988.06 3147.14 84 7.28 1.53 84 11114.95 5520.25 66 9.24 0.37 66
2006 2668.75 2479.17 81 7.25 1.50 81 11296.21 5763.61 63 9.25 0.39 63
2007 3016.74 2996.67 84 7.27 1.63 84 13775.26 7546.54 69 9.43 0.42 69
2008 2852.38 2782.56 82 7.24 1.62 82 15579.79 8167.87 73 9.56 0.42 73
2009 3008.26 2974.03 81 7.28 1.54 81 18361.10 11086.31 74 9.69 0.49 74
2010 2749.08 2502.10 76 7.15 1.74 76 23461.53 17798.25 68 9.89 0.53 68
2011 2917.49 2701.21 77 7.24 1.77 77 21961.51 8726.40 62 9.92 0.39 62
CO 1998 2118.22 2572.49 18 6.04 2.64 18 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2000.06 2618.33 17 5.89 2.74 17 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1793.05 2551.32 21 5.54 2.72 21 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1959.31 2362.98 16 6.19 2.47 16 5497.33 1593.74 11 8.57 0.31 11
2002 2199.06 3192.30 18 5.45 3.06 18 6031.03 973.12 11 8.69 0.15 11
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2003 1775.06 2425.82 18 5.80 2.57 18 6982.06 1906.24 15 8.82 0.27 15
2004 2233.00 2843.94 18 6.11 2.73 18 7802.34 1956.12 15 8.93 0.26 15
2005 2131.39 2924.85 18 5.55 3.19 18 8516.21 3115.39 16 8.96 0.47 16
2006 1793.11 2699.90 18 5.41 3.01 18 10108.59 4811.35 16 9.06 0.71 16
2007 2440.00 3039.16 18 6.19 2.65 18 12647.78 5101.15 17 9.38 0.35 17
2008 2688.25 3054.51 16 6.38 2.66 16 17127.62 11548.88 15 9.60 0.53 15
2009 2947.40 2995.45 15 7.03 1.78 15 17669.03 5501.60 15 9.74 0.30 15
2010 2369.47 2769.70 15 6.05 2.82 15 18367.56 6221.43 15 9.74 0.45 15
2011 2088.00 2184.81 18 6.52 2.17 18 19800.23 5267.59 17 9.86 0.26 17
CT 1998 1629.14 1010.77 7 7.25 0.57 7 . . 0 . . 0
1999 3696.33 4394.93 6 7.74 1.03 6 . . 0 . . 0
2000 3374.83 3147.44 6 7.73 1.00 6 . . 0 . . 0
2001 4053.43 4358.35 7 7.81 1.11 7 5865.99 994.65 7 8.66 0.17 7
2002 4643.25 4299.35 8 8.09 0.90 8 6811.11 1064.44 8 8.81 0.17 8
2003 3546.83 3122.36 6 7.77 1.08 6 7541.01 415.77 5 8.93 0.06 5
2004 3368.30 2431.76 10 7.91 0.68 10 7924.88 1407.79 10 8.96 0.19 10
2005 3519.13 4567.21 8 7.57 1.15 8 9390.75 1255.57 7 9.14 0.13 7
2006 4116.50 4043.90 10 7.95 0.92 10 10223.72 1779.58 10 9.22 0.18 10
2007 3505.22 2348.92 9 7.96 0.69 9 11712.55 2130.87 9 9.35 0.19 9
2008 5080.00 5647.94 6 7.96 1.21 6 14300.30 2949.97 6 9.55 0.22 6
2009 4138.86 3933.42 7 7.92 1.01 7 14035.06 3406.36 7 9.53 0.21 7
2010 4098.14 3510.21 7 8.01 0.88 7 15497.02 3034.58 7 9.63 0.21 7
2011 3284.75 3282.91 8 7.72 0.95 8 15951.15 2377.51 7 9.67 0.16 7
FL 1998 2554.55 2636.13 106 7.08 1.79 106 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2614.08 3237.07 97 6.95 1.91 97 . . 0 . . 0
2000 2775.69 3191.06 55 6.99 2.01 55 . . 0 . . 0
2001 3008.64 3417.63 55 7.13 1.88 55 5252.91 1226.49 42 8.54 0.23 42
2002 4004.06 3855.04 51 7.54 1.79 51 6029.14 1587.95 44 8.67 0.28 44
2003 3290.84 3462.90 58 7.11 2.10 58 7150.79 2201.82 48 8.83 0.31 48
2004 3335.84 4102.03 55 7.29 1.79 55 8097.76 2484.26 48 8.96 0.30 48
2005 3245.45 4702.04 51 7.38 1.49 51 9212.34 4003.89 43 9.07 0.31 43
2006 3552.69 5111.64 51 7.09 1.99 51 10266.39 5588.96 40 9.13 0.44 40
2007 4014.08 4663.80 50 7.49 1.79 50 10307.93 3107.63 45 9.19 0.38 45
2008 4171.35 5590.79 49 7.37 1.85 49 11937.08 4949.32 45 9.33 0.32 45
2009 3520.84 5131.49 50 6.99 2.19 50 12483.18 3539.47 44 9.39 0.29 44
2010 3629.66 4004.72 44 7.45 1.62 44 16103.68 6455.51 41 9.63 0.33 41
2011 3433.17 4102.18 46 7.36 1.67 46 16100.65 8814.13 41 9.62 0.32 41
GA 1998 1105.33 1664.79 111 5.61 2.07 111 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1212.11 2133.15 97 5.50 2.09 97 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1449.82 2784.19 57 5.37 2.36 57 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1428.32 2214.31 56 5.67 2.28 56 4565.10 1239.12 34 8.39 0.26 34
2002 1709.04 3150.41 56 5.41 2.50 56 5581.48 1793.79 33 8.48 0.86 33
2003 1674.18 3428.28 50 5.55 2.27 50 5784.26 1921.51 24 8.60 0.38 24
2004 1540.32 2951.55 50 5.50 2.35 50 7671.76 4026.51 30 8.75 0.92 30
2005 1675.70 2470.76 46 5.86 2.40 46 8251.12 2680.96 34 8.97 0.30 34
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2006 1899.24 3001.79 42 5.96 2.29 42 8825.86 2360.98 34 9.05 0.29 34
2007 2263.03 3518.61 38 6.04 2.43 38 9529.58 3019.18 27 9.12 0.31 27
2008 1787.58 2382.77 33 5.78 2.48 33 11587.75 4943.59 24 9.28 0.41 24
2009 1902.58 3117.79 38 5.61 2.51 38 13192.84 7595.41 32 9.39 0.42 32
2010 1555.05 2097.80 39 5.82 2.29 39 15261.72 11840.58 36 9.48 0.54 36
2011 1531.57 2266.45 35 5.60 2.50 35 14821.94 5090.16 33 9.55 0.33 33
HI 1998 1140.75 1091.51 4 6.30 1.77 4 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1589.67 1095.95 3 7.12 0.96 3 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1775.67 1192.74 3 7.21 1.04 3 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2012.00 1189.55 3 7.42 0.83 3 . . 0 . . 0
2002 1580.80 1081.55 5 6.03 3.39 5 . . 0 . . 0
2003 915.40 553.97 5 6.64 0.69 5 8995.32 3738.26 4 9.04 0.43 4
2004 1206.40 1135.34 5 6.63 1.19 5 8027.69 3433.08 5 8.92 0.41 5
2005 1307.75 1067.76 4 6.91 0.86 4 7571.95 1720.19 3 8.91 0.25 3
2006 1101.75 779.11 4 6.74 0.90 4 10315.77 2827.16 4 9.21 0.27 4
2007 1771.25 1367.42 4 7.15 1.08 4 10007.89 658.75 3 9.21 0.07 3
2008 1147.33 442.97 3 6.99 0.44 3 17131.34 9267.88 3 9.66 0.50 3
2009 2796.00 . 1 7.94 . 1 19871.55 . 1 9.90 . 1
2010 1926.75 1060.69 4 7.39 0.75 4 15053.38 7084.85 4 9.55 0.42 4
2011 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0
IA 1998 849.11 1794.65 53 5.25 1.68 53 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1059.67 2052.33 54 5.30 2.01 54 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1163.16 2206.46 51 5.42 1.92 51 . . 0 . . 0
2001 927.62 1832.94 37 5.32 1.76 37 4748.16 1232.84 25 8.44 0.22 25
2002 1080.00 2054.53 28 5.36 1.99 28 5224.04 1593.30 16 8.53 0.25 16
2003 1079.26 2278.38 27 5.20 2.03 27 5596.97 1007.46 17 8.61 0.18 17
2004 984.92 2188.72 26 4.85 2.24 26 6665.14 2304.46 14 8.76 0.32 14
2005 912.25 2196.46 28 4.92 2.21 28 7447.16 2289.44 19 8.88 0.28 19
2006 933.48 1982.12 29 5.04 2.16 29 7978.59 1480.96 21 8.97 0.19 21
2007 1014.59 2045.78 27 5.04 2.24 27 8824.55 1496.89 19 9.07 0.19 19
2008 572.59 1409.53 27 4.46 2.11 27 11368.58 3182.80 24 9.30 0.27 24
2009 634.40 1439.88 25 4.54 2.10 25 16469.25 11479.62 24 9.56 0.50 24
2010 784.69 1891.69 26 4.50 2.26 26 16279.03 7491.64 25 9.63 0.36 25
2011 622.75 1059.96 24 4.63 2.15 24 17281.74 5435.92 24 9.71 0.29 24
IL 1998 1915.22 2039.10 74 6.80 1.50 74 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2039.42 2380.00 69 6.72 1.67 69 . . 0 . . 0
2000 2164.01 2692.61 68 6.70 1.68 68 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1943.46 2069.21 65 6.85 1.48 65 5717.47 2415.54 57 8.60 0.31 57
2002 1987.61 2023.36 46 6.67 1.83 46 6270.24 2823.11 40 8.67 0.37 40
2003 2138.19 2206.29 42 6.60 2.07 42 6931.04 1482.53 36 8.82 0.23 36
2004 2040.20 2539.70 40 6.44 2.20 40 8211.13 2369.53 33 8.98 0.26 33
2005 1917.23 2353.27 43 6.46 1.79 43 8605.82 2595.79 39 9.02 0.28 39
2006 1980.63 2282.61 40 6.51 1.90 40 10421.62 4419.12 38 9.18 0.36 38
2007 2510.68 3465.31 41 6.69 1.91 41 12169.86 3928.83 39 9.36 0.29 39
2008 2012.68 3045.48 44 6.18 2.23 44 15546.74 14632.14 40 9.51 0.43 40
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2009 2156.28 3176.05 40 6.23 2.45 40 14185.09 5070.47 38 9.51 0.30 38
2010 1666.00 2066.70 44 6.21 2.04 44 19032.69 14877.23 44 9.73 0.42 44
2011 2171.50 2927.36 40 6.22 2.42 40 18344.68 5021.59 40 9.78 0.27 40
IN 2003 1649.25 2370.52 24 6.24 1.65 24 6884.33 2170.24 19 8.79 0.31 19
2004 1591.21 2183.46 24 6.45 1.43 24 7734.78 1865.94 19 8.92 0.25 19
2005 1972.68 3039.02 25 6.62 1.45 25 9288.90 5964.20 22 9.02 0.44 22
2006 1737.81 2383.75 26 6.46 1.55 26 10825.71 8876.06 25 9.15 0.46 25
2007 1691.65 1601.06 26 6.68 1.50 26 11002.11 3678.46 23 9.24 0.41 23
2008 2315.56 3771.24 27 6.66 1.62 27 11053.83 4715.52 24 9.19 0.57 24
2009 1859.04 2602.55 27 6.54 1.58 27 13065.81 5177.26 25 9.36 0.57 25
2010 2363.33 3663.95 27 6.75 1.71 27 16362.84 8542.15 27 9.58 0.56 27
2011 1926.80 3586.77 30 6.30 1.80 30 15668.48 5960.95 30 9.57 0.47 30
KS 1998 812.74 2029.40 50 4.62 2.42 50 . . 0 . . 0
1999 761.69 1638.91 51 4.86 2.16 51 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1055.36 2132.07 47 5.16 2.18 47 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1018.44 2134.58 32 4.86 2.43 32 4036.40 1532.23 21 8.24 0.35 21
2002 851.18 2038.20 28 4.83 2.04 28 4618.32 1501.20 17 8.38 0.37 17
2003 1161.13 2631.74 24 4.64 2.72 24 5552.28 1640.88 18 8.56 0.39 18
2004 989.04 2316.78 23 4.40 2.70 23 6669.50 1367.83 11 8.79 0.20 11
2005 592.18 991.01 17 4.52 2.53 17 6394.52 1722.91 9 8.73 0.26 9
2006 633.87 1421.98 23 3.95 2.68 23 7227.04 1887.91 15 8.85 0.27 15
2007 724.00 1212.85 21 4.63 2.56 21 7258.34 2144.50 15 8.84 0.32 15
2008 617.63 1486.77 24 4.08 2.31 24 10000.85 2734.45 21 9.17 0.29 21
2009 761.48 1994.03 23 4.12 2.41 23 12874.11 4391.28 22 9.41 0.32 22
2010 757.86 1782.16 22 4.65 2.26 22 11578.77 3946.00 22 9.30 0.35 22
2011 674.60 1820.44 25 4.20 2.51 25 14580.75 6887.72 23 9.48 0.49 23
KY 2000 1372.93 2559.16 30 5.44 2.45 30 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1297.93 1838.57 28 5.42 2.62 28 4036.06 1608.75 24 8.23 0.38 24
2002 1518.56 2360.15 32 5.81 2.20 32 4568.06 1353.64 26 8.39 0.28 26
2003 1365.83 2290.43 29 5.61 2.29 29 5392.58 1978.43 24 8.52 0.39 24
2004 1184.62 1804.00 26 5.52 2.20 26 6320.87 2287.17 21 8.70 0.32 21
2005 1503.11 2660.09 27 5.52 2.30 27 6372.96 2318.52 21 8.70 0.35 21
2006 1841.32 2983.14 25 5.83 2.31 25 7091.80 3002.84 19 8.74 0.61 19
2007 1333.26 2458.16 27 5.45 2.41 27 7402.65 2385.76 20 8.70 1.10 20
2008 1256.75 2090.24 24 5.12 2.78 24 10213.45 3879.04 21 9.16 0.41 21
2009 1966.50 2974.51 20 5.97 2.47 20 13063.02 10692.82 18 9.33 0.48 18
2010 1798.45 2655.97 22 5.68 2.66 22 10951.32 5302.18 17 9.14 0.66 17
2011 1669.30 2789.48 20 5.18 2.85 20 12887.79 3244.17 19 9.43 0.25 19
LA 2008 1181.38 1549.66 26 5.77 2.17 26 9885.81 3275.27 21 9.13 0.43 21
2009 1156.17 1381.91 24 5.53 2.44 24 11361.36 5101.90 19 9.23 0.50 19
2010 1306.40 2135.42 25 5.50 2.38 25 12227.67 9150.26 22 9.20 0.66 22
2011 1416.08 2051.03 25 5.76 2.50 25 13909.64 3844.48 19 9.50 0.28 19
MA 1998 3040.06 3560.46 17 7.45 1.16 17 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2668.40 2537.06 15 7.38 1.20 15 . . 0 . . 0
2000 3492.94 3555.67 16 7.52 1.40 16 . . 0 . . 0
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2001 3410.13 3651.13 16 7.42 1.46 16 8413.99 8440.90 12 8.81 0.60 12
2002 3442.00 3733.66 16 7.58 1.23 16 5895.69 1241.55 9 8.66 0.21 9
2003 2534.50 2758.85 14 7.08 1.61 14 9383.10 9013.23 11 8.94 0.57 11
2004 3447.76 4828.80 21 7.28 1.56 21 8081.33 2197.82 18 8.96 0.26 18
2005 2954.87 3051.40 23 7.25 1.52 23 8492.44 2342.80 21 9.02 0.24 21
2006 1984.33 2277.51 21 6.67 1.72 21 13118.39 10793.59 18 9.32 0.49 18
2007 2370.05 3722.28 22 6.76 1.57 22 14091.16 11434.36 19 9.41 0.45 19
2008 3722.93 5545.08 15 7.41 1.38 15 13294.67 3883.90 15 9.46 0.27 15
2009 2367.93 2574.38 14 7.19 1.18 14 13486.80 3630.77 13 9.48 0.22 13
2010 2990.86 3120.01 14 7.20 1.64 14 15322.99 4759.14 13 9.60 0.27 13
2011 3654.36 5632.16 11 7.50 1.25 11 16360.45 4950.32 11 9.67 0.27 11
MD 1998 2973.22 2512.32 32 7.48 1.26 32 . . 0 . . 0
1999 3517.17 3578.67 23 7.74 0.98 23 . . 0 . . 0
2000 3436.38 2713.03 13 7.82 0.87 13 . . 0 . . 0
2001 4083.83 3087.75 12 7.99 0.90 12 5106.37 949.44 11 8.52 0.20 11
2002 3958.43 2949.12 14 7.97 0.89 14 5944.15 1251.39 14 8.67 0.21 14
2003 4126.85 2696.23 13 8.03 0.92 13 6257.75 1462.82 12 8.72 0.23 12
2004 3628.25 2564.61 12 7.92 0.82 12 7709.09 1974.82 12 8.92 0.26 12
2005 4483.27 2663.02 11 8.19 0.78 11 6998.57 929.72 9 8.85 0.13 9
2006 3669.08 3385.82 12 7.83 0.93 12 10206.58 2110.85 12 9.21 0.21 12
2007 3757.83 2852.34 12 7.71 1.47 12 10210.26 2821.95 11 9.20 0.25 11
2008 4213.83 3314.87 12 7.72 1.58 12 12733.43 3290.62 11 9.42 0.25 11
2009 5319.13 3533.63 8 8.25 0.99 8 11155.02 2571.94 7 9.30 0.23 7
2010 3738.00 3071.34 9 7.83 1.02 9 13287.21 3706.27 9 9.47 0.25 9
2011 5494.45 5052.51 11 8.11 1.18 11 15155.95 6048.65 11 9.57 0.34 11
ME 1999 1784.18 3545.32 11 6.29 1.69 11 . . 0 . . 0
2000 798.90 762.74 10 6.37 0.80 10 . . 0 . . 0
2001 866.22 841.53 9 6.27 1.15 9 5899.08 784.50 7 8.67 0.14 7
2002 672.43 981.72 7 5.90 1.09 7 5421.55 1387.84 5 8.57 0.26 5
2007 455.22 486.18 9 5.54 1.38 9 . . 0 . . 0
2008 577.86 579.34 7 5.60 1.66 7 . . 0 . . 0
2009 390.33 415.61 6 5.30 1.50 6 . . 0 . . 0
2010 315.29 222.46 7 5.55 0.70 7 . . 0 . . 0
2011 357.14 324.29 7 5.53 0.93 7 . . 0 . . 0
MI 2001 2437.66 2918.32 29 6.76 1.93 29 4394.89 1119.15 25 8.36 0.26 25
2002 2678.46 4960.38 28 6.60 1.81 28 5052.02 930.37 23 8.51 0.19 23
2003 2652.76 5418.02 21 6.49 1.98 21 5558.11 1567.72 19 8.58 0.34 19
2004 1868.60 2617.99 20 6.67 1.49 20 6615.06 1467.27 14 8.77 0.22 14
2005 2054.60 3654.68 25 6.32 1.88 25 7694.10 2427.38 18 8.91 0.25 18
2006 1846.32 2825.92 22 6.31 1.76 22 8437.68 1965.92 16 9.01 0.24 16
2007 1972.32 3272.58 25 6.07 2.19 25 14935.53 21699.29 18 9.29 0.62 18
2008 2012.11 2955.49 27 6.06 2.15 27 12527.02 3229.72 22 9.40 0.26 22
2009 1877.15 2753.51 27 6.14 2.01 27 13048.33 4404.20 23 9.43 0.32 23
2010 1791.81 2966.56 26 6.00 2.00 26 15506.22 6379.94 21 9.58 0.37 21
2011 2327.68 4861.48 25 6.03 2.04 25 18401.67 7173.68 21 9.75 0.37 21
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
MN 2001 1593.49 2871.27 37 5.55 2.41 37 4813.53 1573.53 32 8.44 0.29 32
2002 1396.35 2597.47 31 5.69 2.13 31 5584.56 2184.26 24 8.56 0.35 24
2003 1732.46 3046.11 26 5.47 2.43 26 5958.37 2351.46 21 8.60 0.52 21
2004 1423.04 2633.96 27 5.41 2.27 27 7116.96 1616.54 16 8.85 0.23 16
2005 1724.23 4070.53 26 5.26 2.47 26 8187.22 3287.80 13 8.96 0.31 13
2006 1765.89 3706.60 27 5.71 2.20 27 9131.42 2342.33 14 9.09 0.24 14
2007 1449.47 2417.68 30 5.76 2.12 30 10200.21 2776.88 21 9.20 0.27 21
2008 1577.71 2661.17 28 5.76 2.30 28 13660.25 6083.18 27 9.45 0.38 27
2009 1291.23 3283.06 30 5.10 2.33 30 13710.38 4154.01 29 9.49 0.27 29
2010 1625.16 3344.31 25 5.64 2.31 25 15024.33 4565.17 25 9.58 0.27 25
2011 1541.65 2585.63 26 5.52 2.46 26 19900.57 8287.35 26 9.83 0.37 26
MO 1998 1384.87 1789.82 38 6.36 1.44 38 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2346.20 3602.97 35 6.36 2.20 35 . . 0 . . 0
2000 2107.66 2901.98 38 6.15 2.43 38 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1291.10 1666.76 21 6.05 1.78 21 4983.54 1252.15 17 8.48 0.27 17
2002 2832.67 4342.81 18 6.73 1.95 18 6225.39 1784.52 15 8.70 0.29 15
2003 2191.96 4034.85 25 5.93 2.52 25 7080.02 2561.44 17 8.80 0.36 17
2004 2332.17 4237.76 24 6.06 2.40 24 7334.60 2871.31 18 8.78 0.64 18
2005 2535.93 3440.55 29 6.22 2.53 29 9209.76 3689.95 23 9.06 0.37 23
2006 2255.48 2573.19 27 6.63 1.98 27 10243.57 3248.81 23 9.19 0.31 23
2007 1200.50 1719.23 28 5.43 2.50 28 9125.08 2427.47 22 9.09 0.25 22
2008 1814.26 2165.41 27 6.08 2.39 27 11214.30 3697.32 26 9.27 0.35 26
2009 1825.19 2926.66 27 5.98 2.48 27 11866.57 4808.88 27 9.31 0.38 27
2010 2080.37 2909.41 27 5.99 2.55 27 15732.51 5576.50 25 9.60 0.35 25
2011 2894.96 4411.42 24 6.59 2.16 24 14798.95 3745.77 24 9.57 0.25 24
MS 2010 1298.35 2104.14 17 5.23 2.66 17 10981.42 4400.66 14 9.19 0.58 14
2011 1380.00 2200.31 19 4.68 3.22 19 14807.05 15310.98 15 9.32 0.72 15
MT 2009 996.00 1867.11 7 4.84 2.81 7 13118.94 3808.17 7 9.44 0.30 7
2010 910.38 1783.19 8 5.23 2.17 8 16332.89 4141.19 8 9.68 0.23 8
2011 452.80 821.81 5 4.29 2.75 5 14200.83 3843.96 5 9.53 0.27 5
NC 2000 2442.09 3148.80 35 6.90 1.56 35 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2527.59 3508.26 34 6.61 2.03 34 4601.95 1324.24 29 8.40 0.26 29
2002 1780.33 2997.44 33 6.26 2.05 33 5084.64 1048.73 21 8.52 0.19 21
2003 2282.53 3427.70 38 6.56 2.05 38 6019.75 2049.56 29 8.66 0.29 29
2004 2433.35 3271.46 34 6.69 1.94 34 6036.25 1159.98 23 8.69 0.21 23
2005 2701.42 3844.66 31 6.61 2.23 31 8377.00 4083.28 26 8.96 0.34 26
2006 2969.15 4299.20 27 6.45 2.56 27 8933.45 2630.25 22 9.06 0.26 22
2007 2806.31 4039.36 29 6.49 2.44 29 11426.09 5569.56 24 9.27 0.36 24
2008 2356.43 3188.32 28 6.72 1.86 28 11853.39 4375.17 25 9.33 0.30 25
2009 2685.00 4077.54 29 6.47 2.18 29 13271.58 6430.74 27 9.42 0.34 27
2010 2947.85 4413.61 26 6.71 2.10 26 14580.08 7988.63 25 9.49 0.44 25
2011 2290.96 4080.40 27 5.98 2.43 27 14709.72 3748.94 23 9.57 0.24 23
ND 2011 766.00 1381.47 4 5.01 2.15 4 12425.76 5162.41 4 9.36 0.44 4
NE 2001 562.05 1222.06 20 3.93 2.37 20 . . 0 . . 0
2002 533.53 1360.54 19 4.23 2.06 19 . . 0 . . 0
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2003 570.63 1396.58 16 4.25 2.12 16 . . 0 . . 0
2004 713.53 1827.72 19 3.51 2.64 19 . . 0 . . 0
2005 510.33 1040.81 15 4.45 2.08 15 . . 0 . . 0
2006 801.33 1110.69 15 4.72 2.56 15 9960.69 3433.49 9 9.15 0.35 9
2007 639.33 1698.76 15 3.78 2.36 15 9642.63 2243.55 7 9.15 0.26 7
2008 813.94 1701.11 18 4.48 2.21 18 10768.75 3504.14 15 9.24 0.28 15
2009 911.50 1960.16 16 5.03 2.01 16 12443.33 2605.78 16 9.41 0.22 16
2010 719.79 1024.04 14 5.11 2.07 14 15368.49 4066.29 12 9.61 0.26 12
2011 440.38 700.19 13 4.26 2.29 13 17086.93 6536.34 12 9.67 0.41 12
NH 2003 789.67 954.14 6 6.01 1.25 6 8073.64 1506.33 3 8.98 0.19 3
2004 1587.75 2546.31 8 6.59 1.24 8 9241.90 1720.66 8 9.11 0.20 8
2005 1873.50 2401.78 10 6.83 1.29 10 11076.00 1891.01 9 9.30 0.17 9
2006 1634.78 2675.53 9 6.48 1.39 9 13310.25 1558.80 6 9.49 0.12 6
2007 2340.38 2876.16 8 6.99 1.45 8 13343.93 2310.80 6 9.49 0.18 6
2008 1736.75 1766.40 4 6.90 1.32 4 18555.85 2540.10 4 9.82 0.13 4
2009 2649.80 3523.12 5 7.14 1.43 5 18094.97 4044.47 4 9.78 0.26 4
NJ 1998 4104.00 3571.86 17 7.94 0.93 17 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2952.24 2252.43 17 7.72 0.76 17 . . 0 . . 0
2000 3773.38 3415.28 16 7.94 0.78 16 . . 0 . . 0
2001 3084.86 2365.69 14 7.80 0.70 14 5106.36 1349.19 7 8.51 0.26 7
2002 4277.36 4395.13 14 7.95 0.92 14 5692.50 1737.38 10 8.61 0.27 10
2003 3127.31 1839.55 16 7.86 0.68 16 6580.77 3003.24 8 8.73 0.34 8
2004 4299.23 3217.16 22 8.11 0.76 22 8103.54 4357.98 14 8.91 0.41 14
2005 3516.14 3766.92 22 7.66 1.26 22 7529.17 1095.34 13 8.92 0.14 13
2006 3169.64 2372.15 22 7.55 1.53 22 14652.67 12027.58 10 9.40 0.60 10
2007 3520.62 3285.25 21 7.43 1.78 21 12707.51 8816.48 17 9.33 0.43 17
2008 3853.06 3194.61 16 7.26 2.26 16 15692.37 12536.29 14 9.48 0.55 14
2009 3955.79 3702.55 14 7.80 1.26 14 15506.79 9760.97 14 9.54 0.45 14
2010 4224.00 2393.15 14 8.19 0.59 14 17528.16 12964.92 14 9.63 0.49 14
2011 3132.64 2052.52 14 7.58 1.44 14 22222.96 18062.96 13 9.81 0.58 13
NM 2009 655.71 527.19 7 5.84 1.68 7 10775.84 4235.77 7 9.24 0.31 7
2010 696.56 905.38 9 5.05 2.62 9 10790.77 3921.69 7 9.23 0.35 7
2011 1492.38 2788.29 8 6.12 1.75 8 14892.99 7600.51 6 9.48 0.58 6
NV 2002 2201.25 3100.49 8 6.09 2.68 8 6966.88 1059.68 5 8.84 0.17 5
2003 2253.29 2768.57 7 5.18 3.54 7 6787.26 2361.39 5 8.76 0.41 5
2004 4368.00 3669.72 5 7.89 1.26 5 8673.05 2100.31 5 9.05 0.23 5
2005 1277.33 2140.73 6 5.72 2.14 6 8660.39 3033.09 4 9.03 0.32 4
2006 2686.33 3136.24 9 6.35 2.91 9 8005.18 3232.06 6 8.89 0.54 6
2007 2927.75 3811.88 8 6.41 2.97 8 12916.99 3347.11 8 9.44 0.26 8
2008 1591.73 2078.72 11 5.77 2.85 11 11950.01 3285.93 9 9.36 0.27 9
2009 2274.13 3016.42 8 6.82 1.60 8 13108.50 2823.15 8 9.45 0.27 8
2010 2738.36 3289.76 11 6.60 2.20 11 15425.89 4224.43 10 9.61 0.25 10
2011 2290.71 2654.78 7 6.59 2.05 7 24908.23 20308.00 7 9.94 0.58 7
NY 1998 2132.19 2436.21 52 6.66 2.18 52 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2416.58 2747.45 45 7.07 1.61 45 . . 0 . . 0
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2000 2853.49 3129.06 45 7.42 1.11 45 . . 0 . . 0
2001 3242.28 4043.79 43 7.33 1.44 43 5590.42 2621.72 37 8.54 0.42 37
2002 2766.66 3293.78 44 7.18 1.48 44 6597.20 3619.77 36 8.68 0.47 36
2003 3427.55 3942.44 42 7.16 2.07 42 6155.87 2491.87 37 8.65 0.38 37
2004 2883.38 3912.49 63 7.06 1.84 63 7947.98 4762.75 52 8.86 0.46 52
2005 3028.80 3697.53 64 7.10 1.94 64 7771.71 3128.96 53 8.88 0.42 53
2006 3020.45 4156.70 62 7.14 1.69 62 9034.17 3718.11 55 9.02 0.44 55
2007 3196.18 3713.86 55 7.25 1.76 55 10117.92 4292.29 49 9.15 0.39 49
2008 3437.11 4719.26 38 6.87 2.47 38 15607.42 20432.51 37 9.37 0.68 37
2009 3323.08 4009.90 38 7.52 1.11 38 13472.88 4279.28 32 9.46 0.32 32
2010 3114.32 3725.60 38 7.22 1.79 38 13776.02 6008.00 33 9.46 0.35 33
2011 3588.00 6240.09 40 7.04 2.02 40 15140.17 5564.67 36 9.56 0.36 36
OH 2002 2527.00 3307.23 37 7.06 1.32 37 5908.96 1303.04 28 8.66 0.22 28
2003 2587.85 2724.95 33 7.00 1.95 33 7036.82 1924.44 29 8.81 0.35 29
2004 2527.94 2588.13 34 7.28 1.19 34 7707.24 1442.44 32 8.93 0.18 32
2005 2737.21 3092.45 34 7.17 1.42 34 8634.29 1551.10 26 9.05 0.19 26
2006 2699.14 3322.00 35 6.95 1.62 35 10032.29 4909.26 31 9.16 0.30 31
2007 2786.47 2714.96 36 7.32 1.30 36 10916.53 2376.28 30 9.28 0.21 30
2008 2935.29 3930.51 34 7.02 1.65 34 11690.49 2291.54 31 9.35 0.20 31
2009 2953.63 4831.75 40 7.01 1.57 40 13534.72 4883.91 40 9.46 0.33 40
2010 2437.24 2835.55 38 6.80 1.79 38 16032.38 8480.62 38 9.61 0.36 38
2011 2176.49 2657.24 35 6.85 1.48 35 16131.09 4427.39 35 9.65 0.26 35
OK 2005 973.03 2084.27 38 4.45 2.69 38 8844.59 9644.56 29 8.83 0.61 29
2006 1382.65 2751.57 37 5.02 2.57 37 7603.12 6893.63 28 8.73 0.58 28
2007 1165.94 2019.20 33 4.99 2.68 33 9764.43 8765.00 27 9.03 0.47 27
2008 907.56 2022.08 34 4.79 2.56 34 9381.34 5931.77 29 8.99 0.56 29
2009 1104.82 2458.02 33 5.00 2.39 33 12639.34 11496.96 24 9.24 0.58 24
2010 1314.17 2576.75 29 5.30 2.37 29 14013.95 13477.54 27 9.30 0.65 27
2011 823.24 1745.55 29 4.93 2.36 29 14412.94 9515.59 25 9.40 0.59 25
OR 1998 1143.94 1866.50 18 5.91 1.85 18 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1732.29 2261.67 17 6.24 2.11 17 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1630.78 2488.82 18 6.20 2.00 18 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1424.00 2134.01 19 6.03 1.91 19 . . 0 . . 0
2002 2397.56 4019.29 16 6.43 1.77 16 . . 0 . . 0
2003 1203.31 1619.97 16 5.98 1.88 16 7091.79 2519.14 12 8.82 0.32 12
2004 2312.77 3800.60 13 6.80 1.39 13 . . 0 . . 0
2005 1246.38 2012.70 16 6.18 1.52 16 . . 0 . . 0
2006 2257.20 3245.54 15 6.41 1.89 15 11521.55 2797.04 13 9.32 0.24 13
2007 1826.40 2653.57 15 6.58 1.46 15 11130.62 2044.44 14 9.30 0.19 14
2008 1935.00 3184.08 17 6.25 1.83 17 14682.31 3517.72 16 9.57 0.23 16
2009 2430.36 3640.99 14 6.61 1.81 14 15175.93 3525.53 14 9.60 0.23 14
2010 1850.64 3201.19 14 6.08 2.35 14 17091.32 4036.51 13 9.72 0.23 13
2011 1630.07 2867.50 15 5.78 2.36 15 19629.93 8637.12 14 9.80 0.43 14
PA 1998 2004.91 1946.07 47 6.96 1.39 47 . . 0 . . 0
1999 2282.86 2820.36 42 7.14 1.15 42 . . 0 . . 0
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2000 2262.83 2459.99 42 7.12 1.22 42 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2591.44 3177.39 41 7.15 1.38 41 . . 0 . . 0
2002 2357.03 2555.95 40 7.21 1.16 40 . . 0 . . 0
2003 2845.40 4667.72 40 7.13 1.49 40 . . 0 . . 0
2008 2856.68 4943.77 38 6.67 2.04 38 . . 0 . . 0
2009 2776.63 3268.88 35 6.71 2.06 35 . . 0 . . 0
2010 2782.76 3753.00 41 6.98 1.61 41 . . 0 . . 0
2011 2701.51 4629.25 41 6.84 1.67 41 . . 0 . . 0
RI 2001 1331.00 . 1 7.19 . 1 4444.86 . 1 8.40 . 1
2002 1815.00 . 1 7.50 . 1 7208.26 . 1 8.88 . 1
2003 4083.75 4135.39 4 7.97 0.91 4 10011.33 . 1 9.21 . 1
2004 3034.67 1967.73 3 7.88 0.64 3 5181.99 777.22 3 8.55 0.15 3
2005 2790.67 2302.59 3 7.72 0.77 3 6608.93 2198.37 2 8.77 0.34 2
2006 1776.33 484.87 3 7.45 0.30 3 8928.95 1255.04 3 9.09 0.15 3
2007 3505.00 3163.60 2 7.90 1.07 2 8270.36 3117.66 2 8.98 0.39 2
2008 2340.67 1678.75 3 7.57 0.76 3 9839.77 2289.03 3 9.17 0.25 3
2009 1961.67 908.60 3 7.51 0.45 3 14115.02 3803.33 3 9.53 0.26 3
2010 1166.00 147.96 3 7.06 0.13 3 15595.23 1616.71 3 9.65 0.11 3
2011 2020.50 672.84 4 7.57 0.33 4 15003.24 1753.48 4 9.61 0.12 4
SC 1998 1646.15 2382.98 33 6.17 1.91 33 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1501.39 1956.31 33 6.21 1.85 33 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1490.95 1961.48 19 6.27 1.75 19 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1779.83 2216.75 18 6.59 1.69 18 4621.59 1062.77 16 8.41 0.27 16
2002 2222.11 2600.56 18 6.55 2.19 18 5644.29 1634.80 17 8.61 0.25 17
2003 2272.63 2844.52 16 6.54 2.06 16 7215.46 3583.34 16 8.82 0.33 16
2004 1848.47 2666.79 15 6.22 2.07 15 10264.26 11306.69 12 9.00 0.57 12
2005 2651.17 2905.95 12 6.91 1.86 12 7889.53 1919.36 9 8.95 0.26 9
2006 2962.29 3299.72 14 7.04 1.71 14 9703.19 2700.44 12 9.15 0.27 12
2007 2180.50 2545.26 14 6.80 2.15 14 9584.62 1983.42 13 9.15 0.21 13
2008 2039.07 2559.10 15 6.73 1.78 15 12803.75 2583.14 14 9.44 0.21 14
2009 1793.46 2073.91 13 6.53 1.84 13 14592.41 2403.82 11 9.58 0.16 11
2010 2555.44 3614.53 9 6.70 2.10 9 15033.54 5085.04 9 9.57 0.31 9
2011 2539.77 2831.04 13 6.61 2.49 13 13914.04 2890.61 13 9.52 0.24 13
SD 2002 831.13 1923.49 8 4.24 2.44 8 4442.12 1683.55 5 8.34 0.36 5
2003 232.00 432.07 4 3.68 2.13 4 4868.34 1044.80 3 8.48 0.21 3
2004 2099.40 3852.53 5 5.10 3.54 5 5432.60 1785.25 5 8.54 0.41 5
2005 119.86 191.03 7 3.73 1.64 7 6187.08 1201.84 4 8.72 0.19 4
2006 226.89 403.08 9 3.27 2.59 9 7275.17 3033.44 6 8.83 0.38 6
2007 145.75 243.34 8 3.06 2.38 8 8160.88 2781.22 6 8.95 0.37 6
2008 179.00 290.30 4 4.20 1.53 4 10415.01 4387.50 3 9.20 0.39 3
2009 374.40 738.66 5 4.35 1.86 5 9488.79 4516.64 4 9.07 0.50 4
2010 281.40 498.81 5 4.15 2.16 5 14013.05 3901.63 5 9.52 0.29 5
2011 1116.33 2205.73 6 3.82 3.53 6 15859.38 3851.55 5 9.65 0.25 5
TN 1998 1833.24 3104.65 72 6.17 1.93 72 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1727.65 3144.11 68 5.91 2.02 68 . . 0 . . 0
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2000 1470.77 2468.48 31 6.01 1.78 31 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1438.00 2464.06 35 5.64 2.17 35 4562.21 1795.46 29 8.36 0.37 29
2002 1845.00 3862.56 34 5.15 2.67 34 4310.55 1858.99 22 8.29 0.40 22
2003 2207.50 4185.64 36 5.89 2.40 36 5381.90 1763.20 30 8.53 0.35 30
2004 2265.75 4246.16 36 5.93 2.26 36 7562.90 6767.82 32 8.73 0.57 32
2005 1990.11 3053.85 36 6.01 2.28 36 6936.59 2475.87 28 8.78 0.38 28
2006 2795.21 3671.37 29 6.41 2.36 29 8230.80 3046.92 25 8.95 0.36 25
2007 1455.17 2652.67 29 5.32 2.58 29 5339.41 2889.22 26 8.44 0.57 26
2008 2638.70 4431.94 27 6.03 2.44 27 9429.04 2560.64 22 9.12 0.26 22
2009 1651.36 2714.76 25 5.78 2.22 25 9848.75 3194.17 24 9.13 0.39 24
2010 1537.18 2614.39 22 5.38 2.71 22 10252.25 3812.88 20 9.14 0.49 20
2011 2447.79 4205.03 24 6.43 1.90 24 13518.88 5054.30 20 9.46 0.32 20
TX 2000 2280.67 3318.77 86 6.63 1.83 86 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2366.51 2957.74 88 6.67 1.93 88 . . 0 . . 0
2002 2147.48 2706.98 91 6.41 2.21 91 . . 0 . . 0
2003 2335.74 3213.95 95 6.39 2.19 95 . . 0 . . 0
2004 2265.84 3261.44 93 6.46 1.98 93 . . 0 . . 0
2005 1772.31 2742.68 106 6.04 2.09 106 . . 0 . . 0
2006 1778.82 2528.57 97 6.04 2.23 97 11686.68 10867.66 70 9.10 0.67 70
2007 1753.61 2467.78 101 5.97 2.27 101 12129.51 11358.05 68 9.21 0.53 68
2008 1813.89 2547.18 93 6.13 2.19 93 13974.49 12296.02 77 9.34 0.58 77
2009 1787.28 2829.91 90 6.11 2.10 90 16376.05 13945.55 72 9.50 0.57 72
2010 1653.68 2405.36 94 6.13 2.05 94 20025.22 16300.70 77 9.67 0.64 77
2011 2068.35 3832.54 86 6.08 2.10 86 22936.73 17392.40 65 9.83 0.62 65
UT 1998 951.13 1272.27 16 5.66 1.82 16 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1043.24 1710.57 17 5.59 1.93 17 . . 0 . . 0
2000 303.07 341.56 14 5.03 1.27 14 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1192.63 2499.33 16 5.49 1.91 16 3912.22 1205.23 14 8.23 0.31 14
2002 1711.67 3005.40 15 5.70 2.27 15 4483.40 1303.96 13 8.37 0.27 13
2003 2156.69 3032.01 13 6.24 2.06 13 5476.93 2136.16 13 8.55 0.35 13
2004 1291.25 2351.85 12 5.45 2.13 12 5652.46 998.71 12 8.63 0.18 12
2005 1149.21 1475.50 14 5.87 2.02 14 6114.30 1903.72 12 8.68 0.29 12
2006 2051.31 3181.74 13 6.12 2.03 13 8116.45 2674.15 11 8.96 0.28 11
2007 951.67 1642.12 12 5.76 1.68 12 8199.12 2194.26 11 8.98 0.29 11
2008 1880.54 3130.25 13 6.00 2.09 13 12319.15 10752.92 12 9.24 0.53 12
2009 1146.50 2418.00 8 5.08 2.18 8 19066.46 24818.49 8 9.47 0.79 8
2010 2356.40 2982.92 10 6.76 1.83 10 12233.34 4199.51 10 9.36 0.34 10
2011 2072.78 2315.16 9 6.69 1.83 9 11939.88 2741.62 9 9.36 0.23 9
VA 1999 2163.83 3145.65 47 6.86 1.51 47 . . 0 . . 0
2000 2957.81 4416.64 21 6.99 1.51 21 . . 0 . . 0
2001 2650.17 4247.87 24 6.65 2.07 24 5364.76 1758.76 21 8.55 0.28 21
2002 2027.21 2361.63 19 7.01 1.15 19 5466.07 1717.03 18 8.57 0.27 18
2003 3626.33 5260.93 18 7.37 1.31 18 6327.16 1961.95 17 8.71 0.28 17
2004 3353.11 5117.73 18 7.08 1.69 18 7853.96 3415.77 16 8.90 0.36 16
2006 3331.60 5168.00 20 6.70 2.24 20 9050.88 2449.50 19 9.08 0.26 19
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
2007 3551.24 5334.38 17 6.82 2.07 17 10806.18 4125.97 15 9.22 0.37 15
2008 2944.38 3510.67 16 6.77 2.06 16 11820.56 3187.60 16 9.35 0.26 16
2009 3149.15 4461.06 20 6.88 2.18 20 15278.79 12479.85 20 9.50 0.44 20
2010 3420.63 4320.27 19 6.91 2.25 19 14843.37 8297.78 19 9.52 0.39 19
2011 2619.26 2948.99 23 6.98 1.61 23 15971.69 5915.47 22 9.62 0.33 22
VT 2001 821.25 680.87 4 6.38 0.99 4 5666.61 615.50 3 8.64 0.11 3
2002 628.20 570.37 5 6.16 0.81 5 6101.65 1089.40 2 8.71 0.18 2
2003 775.25 603.56 4 6.46 0.68 4 7457.04 904.78 4 8.91 0.12 4
2004 1633.14 3181.02 7 6.43 1.24 7 8481.75 1315.27 5 9.04 0.16 5
2005 1836.50 3429.40 6 6.45 1.42 6 10568.57 2445.73 5 9.25 0.22 5
2006 1607.57 3159.69 7 6.33 1.37 7 13503.54 4372.78 7 9.47 0.30 7
2007 2427.50 3864.77 4 6.88 1.46 4 12292.48 2834.93 4 9.40 0.23 4
2008 686.00 432.75 2 6.42 0.68 2 16488.16 3945.03 2 9.70 0.24 2
2009 360.50 236.88 2 5.77 0.71 2 16712.07 3012.68 2 9.72 0.18 2
2010 2827.67 4280.13 3 6.89 1.81 3 19730.94 2612.98 3 9.88 0.13 3
2011 2011.25 3598.76 4 5.98 2.17 4 25073.62 1485.64 4 10.13 0.06 4
WA 1998 1678.91 2740.89 22 6.05 2.01 22 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1636.73 1930.03 22 6.37 1.84 22 . . 0 . . 0
2000 2030.09 2969.30 23 6.60 1.63 23 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1888.52 2971.38 23 6.57 1.57 23 4905.84 1289.30 18 8.46 0.27 18
2002 1850.46 2308.31 24 6.20 2.23 24 6189.36 1986.10 16 8.69 0.26 16
2003 2079.50 2411.59 20 6.39 2.09 20 7138.43 1931.02 16 8.84 0.26 16
2004 1931.00 2234.20 22 6.55 1.77 22 8257.66 3086.56 17 8.97 0.30 17
2005 1561.41 1940.25 22 6.49 1.54 22 13840.24 20265.70 17 9.18 0.68 17
2006 1887.29 3003.83 24 6.38 1.90 24 9767.47 3330.06 19 9.14 0.28 19
2007 2212.80 3195.13 20 6.37 2.15 20 13778.54 13718.12 18 9.33 0.53 18
2008 1838.39 2499.92 18 6.25 2.26 18 12219.06 3747.48 18 9.37 0.29 18
2009 1748.53 2023.22 17 6.37 1.89 17 15604.95 6515.85 17 9.58 0.38 17
2010 1930.28 2773.72 18 6.43 1.67 18 19868.53 8770.69 17 9.82 0.40 17
2011 1671.89 2321.80 19 6.29 1.71 19 18375.82 8458.34 17 9.74 0.39 17
WI 1998 1625.94 2337.00 66 6.45 1.51 66 . . 0 . . 0
1999 1492.06 2452.53 65 6.13 1.80 65 . . 0 . . 0
2000 1558.05 2495.54 66 6.23 1.66 66 . . 0 . . 0
2001 1477.54 2870.39 35 6.04 1.77 35 4836.80 1495.99 24 8.44 0.28 24
2002 1438.72 1895.53 29 6.35 1.57 29 6162.16 1674.11 23 8.70 0.25 23
2003 1226.64 1772.33 28 5.92 1.73 28 6551.88 1445.91 18 8.76 0.23 18
2004 1504.37 2333.54 27 6.22 1.58 27 7589.25 1888.95 21 8.90 0.27 21
2005 1478.83 2072.28 30 6.24 1.63 30 8909.31 2088.56 26 9.07 0.23 26
2006 1660.79 3368.63 29 5.83 2.07 29 10397.91 1885.77 24 9.23 0.17 24
2007 1297.37 2005.02 27 5.99 1.80 27 12846.44 9489.97 25 9.35 0.39 25
2008 1593.83 2328.41 30 6.07 2.07 30 12701.90 2608.61 28 9.43 0.22 28
2009 1259.47 2216.66 30 5.74 2.12 30 18466.41 15143.07 29 9.67 0.48 29
2010 1736.61 2211.16 28 6.11 2.21 28 17365.88 10329.55 27 9.69 0.33 27
2011 1432.87 2180.68 30 5.91 2.19 30 17795.42 5877.10 27 9.73 0.38 27
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Table 7 Descriptive for the main outcomes in inpatient file (NIS) (Continued)
WV 2000 472.63 557.48 19 4.94 2.21 19 . . 0 . . 0
2001 248.80 278.53 15 4.51 1.88 15 3888.09 534.79 5 8.26 0.13 5
2002 1351.47 3077.94 19 5.29 2.30 19 4409.61 2031.18 8 8.27 0.57 8
2003 1049.50 1569.87 18 5.31 2.37 18 5942.96 2070.32 16 8.63 0.36 16
2004 814.67 1118.55 15 5.64 1.77 15 5359.41 1357.20 6 8.56 0.25 6
2005 2531.00 3497.98 14 6.77 2.06 14 7780.89 2124.96 9 8.92 0.29 9
2006 823.38 1262.49 13 5.26 2.11 13 7300.30 1453.31 6 8.88 0.20 6
2007 1574.67 2429.76 15 5.42 2.68 15 9333.81 3269.12 8 9.09 0.32 8
2008 1678.00 2495.48 13 5.05 3.14 13 10792.28 5094.92 11 9.17 0.52 11
2009 919.25 1309.24 12 5.92 1.59 12 10234.95 1996.01 11 9.22 0.19 11
2010 1210.15 1406.11 13 6.14 1.83 13 14794.36 10101.22 11 9.48 0.45 11
2011 2780.43 4238.53 7 6.30 2.34 7 19117.61 11847.47 7 9.74 0.48 7
WY 2007 430.00 270.70 4 5.90 0.67 4 12490.09 4404.88 4 9.39 0.35 4
2008 257.00 318.24 6 4.54 1.86 6 13683.53 3694.38 4 9.50 0.25 4
2009 414.00 355.24 7 5.56 1.16 7 14386.57 4346.47 7 9.54 0.29 7
2010 319.14 300.32 7 5.17 1.38 7 13824.34 1395.73 7 9.53 0.11 7
2011 405.00 254.13 6 5.58 1.35 6 17362.34 5164.73 6 9.72 0.33 6
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Table 8 Descriptive for the main outcomes in outpatient file (SASD)
Hospital state Calendar year Total number of surgical procedures Log of total number of surgical procedures
Mean Std N Mean Std N
CA 2007 3515.62 3625.26 853 7.57 1.32 852
2008 3432.36 3886.85 831 7.48 1.38 831
2009 4068.27 4485.46 584 7.73 1.24 584
2010 4377.43 4874.96 497 7.78 1.27 497
2011 4527.95 5071.43 458 7.77 1.37 458
CO 2008 4870.29 5532.98 78 7.42 2.09 78
2009 5103.38 5509.80 74 7.67 1.74 74
2010 5498.03 5641.74 73 7.80 1.62 73
2011 5576.49 5952.14 78 7.77 1.66 78
2012 5473.14 5843.59 78 7.65 1.89 78
FL 2007 5410.50 5283.45 572 8.19 1.03 572
2008 5337.35 5276.53 587 8.17 1.05 587
2009 5223.05 4927.84 588 8.17 1.01 588
2010 5109.85 4912.04 590 8.13 1.04 590
2011 4832.48 4472.26 605 8.08 1.06 605
2012 4834.20 4207.72 599 8.13 0.95 599
2013 4792.27 4237.82 605 8.09 1.05 605
KY 2007 7385.13 8979.66 104 8.13 1.42 104
2008 13539.70 16737.80 105 8.86 1.21 105
2009 13416.91 17141.52 131 8.83 1.22 131
2010 11449.95 14604.36 150 8.67 1.24 150
2011 10718.50 14358.56 164 8.53 1.39 164
2012 10301.86 14306.77 177 8.38 1.52 177
2013 14892.33 20248.58 206 8.69 1.58 206
MD 1998 6807.10 5681.28 52 8.49 0.90 52
1999 6884.13 5819.98 52 8.47 0.96 52
2000 7560.06 6166.07 49 8.64 0.82 49
2001 8000.85 6432.89 48 8.66 0.93 48
2002 8250.75 6402.70 48 8.74 0.80 48
2003 17713.54 22895.29 48 9.29 0.96 48
2004 18459.33 23312.07 48 9.39 0.85 48
2005 19235.23 23951.71 48 9.43 0.88 48
2006 20425.46 26811.17 48 9.48 0.86 48
2007 38515.06 44829.21 52 9.93 1.45 52
2008 64059.83 71433.03 52 10.52 1.35 52
2009 65421.62 84632.03 52 10.51 1.35 52
2010 65719.71 86014.19 51 10.51 1.34 51
2011 64722.55 89320.17 53 10.26 1.83 53
2012 64992.65 93877.46 54 10.13 2.11 54
NJ 2008 5504.35 4211.93 79 8.13 1.33 79
2009 6039.51 4190.19 75 8.28 1.32 75
2010 6359.12 4434.84 74 8.40 1.12 74
2011 6489.85 4579.18 74 8.39 1.23 74
2012 6287.65 4574.22 75 8.26 1.53 75
2013 6199.96 4668.46 75 8.22 1.48 75
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